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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TONYIA B. JENSEN,

)
)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

)
) '

-vs-

"

)

Case No. 11458

)

CLARK EVON JENSEN,

)
•

Defendant and Appellant.

)

•

:

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMEMT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a divorce proceeding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This case was tried before the Honorable George E.
Ballif, Judge of the Fourth Judicial District Court, who decreed
that both parties were entitled to a decree of divorce, that the
defendant was entitled to the care, custody and control of the
minor children, subject to plaintiff's visitation rights, and
that the property of the parties, both personal and real, be
divided equally between them as set forth in the Decree of
Divorce.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Reversal of the lower court's decree of divorce with
instructions to award the real and personal property to the
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defendant and appellant on a more equitable basis as contended
for by the appellant herein.

In the alternative, to reverse

the decree of divorce of the lower court and grant to defendant
and appellant a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties to this divorce action were married in
1954.

During the period of their marriage, the parties lived

together until the 26th day of May, 1974, at which time the
plaintiff left the home of the parties voluntarily.

The parties

remained separated for approximately 18 months and the divorce
was granted on December 3, 1975.

During the marriage, the

parties were both employed regularly.

The plaintiff's income

through 1973 was $60,040.85. (Tr.51).

The defendant's income

through 1973 was $174,374.59. (Tr.51).

The marriage produced

three children, the custody of which was awarded to the defendant, subject to the right of the plaintiff to visit with said
children at reasonable times and places.
The assets of the parties were comprised primarily of
real estate in the American Fork area, including a home with 7
acres of property valued at a total of approximately $120,000.00,
and a duplex valued at $32,500.00, the latter property being
subject to mortgages. (Tr.41).
The court granted each party a decree of divorce on the
following grounds:

-2~
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"The court finds that the marriage between the
parties has deteriorated because of the difference in interests and goals which have developed
between the parties over the past years, and that
the differences in the plaintiff's seeking work
outside the home and the defendant demanding
domestic obedience and service from her have
caused mental and physical anguish and suffering
to both parties entitling each to a decree of
divorce from the other."
Further, the court, in the Decree dated December 3,
1975, distributed the property of the parties as follows:
"(a) A home located in Highland, Utah, at Rt. #1,
Box 156-9, which is hereby awarded to the plaintiff
and defendant in equal interests, subject to the
right of the defendant to acquire the plaintiff's
one-half interest in the home as set forth hereafter.
"(b) Certain real property consisting of approximately seven (7) acres surrounding the above referenced home and upon which said home is located,
which is hereby awarded to the plaintiff and the
defendant in equal interests, provided, however,
that the defendant shall have the option of acquiring the plaintiff's one-half interest in the home
and the 7 acre lot, by paying the sum of $50,000.00
cash forthwith, or he may pay said sum over a ten
(10) year period at an annual rate of not less
than $5000.00, which may be made in monthly installments or a single payment. Said payment or payments
shall bear no interest except that in the event the
defendant fails to make a yearly payment or any part
thereof, the unpaid delinquent sum shall carry interest at a rate of ten (10%) percent per annum. Further,
the defendant, if he elects to have payments on a
monthly basis, will be entitled to a thirty (30) day
grace period, but will be required to have all payments met by the end of each year. The plaintiff is
entitled to have a lien against the property for the
amount of her interest.
"(c) The plaintiff, TONYIA B. JENSEN, is hereby awarded
the following specific property:
1.

A 1974 Comet automobile.

2.

Beehive Savings Account.
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3.

That certain duplex located in the City of
American Fork, subject to certain mortgages.

4.

Food storage and meat of the parties.

5.

Savings bonds of the parties.

"(d) The defendant, CLARK EVON JENSEN, is hereby awarded
the following specific property:
1.

Household furniture, appliances and tools.

2.

A 1970 Chevrolet vehicle.

3.

A 19 75 Volkswagon.

4.

Water stock.

5.

John Hancock Insurance.

6 .' Silver coins .
7.

Camper for pickup.

8.

Boat and motor.

9.

Two horses of the parties.

10.

The following insurance policies should also be
awarded to the defendant: Ideal Insurance Company; Beneficial Life; G.I. Insurance; John
Hancock Family Plan; American Western Insurance
group plan through defendant's work; American
National Family Plan. Defendant should name
the minor children as beneficiaries on said
policies during the period of their minority."
(Tr.18 and 19) .

The defendant filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to have the
court open the judgment filed on December 3, 1975, and take additional testimony of the defendant and the plaintiff for the purpose of modifying the decree of divorce with respect to the property distribution. (Tr.ll).

The defendant's motion for a new
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trial was denied January 26, 1976, after hearing of oral arguments on the motion.

From the divorce decree, the defendant

appeals.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PROPERTY AND
CASH TO THE PLAINTIFF IN AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO
FIFTY (50%) PERCENT OF THE TOTAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY THE PARTIES DURING THEIR MARRIAGE.
It is well settled that the trial court has wide latitude
of discretion in adjusting the financial and property rights of
the parties; however, this discretion is not without limitations.
In the case of Derose v. Derose, 19 Utah 2d 77, 426 P2d 221 (1967),
the Utah Supreme Court stated:
"We remain cognizant of the prerogatives of the
trial court and the latitude of discretion it is
properly allowed in divorce cases. But the discretion is not without limit, nor immune from
correction on review, if that is warranted. Due
to the seriousness of such proceedings and to the
vital effect they have on people's lives, it is
also the responsibility of this court to carefully
survey what is done and while the determinations
of the trial court are given deference and not
disturbed lightly, changes should be made if that
seems essential to the accomplishment of the desired objectives of the decree: that it is to make
such an arrangement in property and economic resources of the parties that they will have the best
opportunities to reconstruct their lives on a happy
and useful basis for themselves and for their children. An important consideration in this regard is
the elimination or minimizing of potential frictions
or difficulties in the future."
( Underlining added.)
It is conceded that the division of the marital property
is perhaps the most difficult task which the court is required to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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perform.

To aid in this division, however, courts have devised

a "one-third to the wife - two-thirds to the husband" general
rule.

In the case of Anderson v. Anderson, 18 Utah 2d 286, 422

P2d 192 (1967), the Supreme Court sustained the decree of the
lower court which had awarded to the defendant husband two-thirds
of the net marital estate and one-third to the plaintiff wife.
The factual similarities of the Anderson case are significant.
In that case both parties were awarded or had grounds for divorce.
The trial judge held a "taut rein" at the trial,concerning himself only with various factors bearing upon the financial situation of the parties in reaching a solution to the property distribution.

The parties were married for a long period of time and

had raised their children.

The court specifically held:

"The court has sustained the one-third, two-thirds
property division used by the trial court in the
present case, without regard to which party was
granted the divorce."
See also Wooley v. Wooley, 113 Utah 391, 195 P2d 743 (1948);
Griffen v. Griffen, 18 Utah 98, 55 Pac. 84 (1898).
The very recent case of Cox v. Cox, 532 P2d 994 (1975),
involved a divorce action in which the trial court divided the
net assets belonging to the parties one-third to the wife and
the remaining two-thirds to the husband defendant.

This court,

in affirming the lower court's award, said:
"Because of the variableness and complexities
involved in family troubles there is no firm
rule or formula that can be uniformly applied
in all cases in legal surgery necessary to severing such relationships which will best serve the
desired objectives of allocating the economic
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

resources so that the parties involved can
reconstruct their lives in the most happy
and useful manner. However, as an aid in
that endeavor, in the past the courts have
often resorted to a general "rule of thumb"
of one-third to the wife and two-thirds to
the husband; and that is what the court appears
to have done here. Upon our survey of the circumstances of these parties we see no reason
to believe that the application of that general
formula is so inequitable or unjust that we
should interfere therewith."
In addition to the general principle of law announced
by this court in the Anderson and Cox cases aforesaid, the
Supreme Court has set forth certain principles which govern
the division of property in the State of Utah in divorce actions.
In the case of Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P2d 265, the
Supreme Court stated:
"Plaintiff sets out the elements which should
be taken into consideration by the court as
governing its discretion in coming to a conclusion as to a property settlement: (1) The
amount and kind of property owned by each of
the parties; (2) whether the property was
his before coveture or accumulated jointly;
(3) the ability and opportunity of each to earn
money;
(4) the financial condition and necessities of each party; (5) the health of the
parties;
(6) the standard of living of the
parties;
(7) the duration of the marriage;
(8) what was given up by each party to the
marriage; (9) what age were they when married."
In Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P2d 977 (1956),
the Supreme Court further established as a principle to be considered by the trial court in effecting a property distribution,
"considerations relative to the children of the parties."
Applying the principles set forth in the Anderson, Cox,
Pinion, and Wilson cases to the facts of the present case,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
7 - may contain errors.
Machine-generated-OCR,

defendant submits that the trial court erred in dividing the
property equally between the parties.
The facts of the present case show that the parties
were married in 1954.

During their marriage, some twenty years

before separation, there is no evidence that the parties were
having marital difficulties.
the home of the parties.

In May of 1974, the plaintiff left

The testimony indicates that the plain-

tiff had a gross earnings of $980.00 per month from the American
Fork Hospital and earnings of approximately $35.00 per month
from the Utah State Training School in American Fork. (Tr.18 and
29-30).

The plaintiff had lived separately from the defendant

during the 18 month period prior to the entry of the decree of
divorce and during that time had been able to save an average
of $106.00 per month. (Tr.26).

Further, the plaintiff had estab-

lished a savings account with the Beehive Credit Union and had
increased that account by the sum of $800.00 since the separation
of the parties and had also established a savings account at
Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Association and had completely
funded said savings account with $4,100.00 during the period of
separation. (Tr.27).

Further, the plaintiff had invested in a

mobile home and was capable of paying for the mobile home and
at the time of the divorce was making application for approval
of a loan for purchasing a home. (Tr.28).

Thus, the testimony

is clear that the plaintiff, through her training and employment was capable of supporting herself and was, in fact, self-
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supporting and not in need of any assistance from the defendant.
The plaintiff's cumulative earnings through 19 73 amounted to
$60f040.85. (Tr.51).

It is interesting to note that the plain-

tiff's reported income for the years 1972 and 1973 was in excess of $10,500.00 each year. (Tr.51).

Further, the plaintiff

testified that she made a gross earnings of approximately
$980.00 from the American Fork Training School which would
give her an annual gross of $11,760.00, together with an
approximate $35.00 per month earning, or an additional $420.00,
for a total annual earnings of $12,180.00.

On the other hand,

the defendant's income for the years 1972 and 1973 was
$14,343.40 and $16,769.53, respectively. (Tr.51).

Defendant's

present income is less than the amount he reported in 19 7 3
and he currently makes a net wage of approximately $900.00
per month. (Tr.16).

Defendant's drop in income is occasioned

by his having terminated one of the two jobs he was working
in order to take care of the children.
The plaintiff testified that from the inception of
the marriage she had been employed and had contributed to the
income of the parties.

On cross examination plaintiff was

asked as to her willingness to give up her present employment
and return to the family.

She stated in essence, that she

was not willing to give up her whole life to comply with her
husband's and family's wishes.

The plaintiff further testified,

on cross examination, that for a period of one year and greater,

-9-
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the divorce action had been pending, during which time she had
been invited several times to return to the home, but that she
refused to do so and that all efforts by her husband, the defendant, for reconciliation had failed. (Tr.22).
The defendant testified that the plaintiff had voluntarily left him to keep the company of a third female friend,
and that in spite of his efforts to have her return to the home
and to make the marriage work, she refused, giving numerous excuses, including schooling, and that she would never make an
attempt at reconciliation.

The defendant further testified that

his wife, the plaintiff, had not attended to the duties of the
home in respect to cleaning and caring for the home, cooking for
the children, and generally taking care of the children. (Tr.47-48).
Further, the daughter of the parties, Charlotte, corroborated the
testimony of the defendant, that her mother had not attended to
the household duties, had ignored her responsibility to cook and
care for the home and the children, and was not in her opinion a
dutiful mother.

Further, the daughter of the parties, Charlotte,

testified that she had been attending to the duties of taking
care of the household chores, cooking and caring for the children
for a period of nine years. (Tr.49-51).

The latter testimony is

uncontroverted, that the defendant, together with his daughter,
Charlotte, had taken all of the responsibility, or substantially
all of the responsibility, in caring for the household and the
children.
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In light of this testimony, and the evidence adduced
at the trial, the defendant contends that the court abused its
discretion by giving the plaintiff an equal share in the total
marriage assets of the parties.

The defendant contends that the

court did not consider the relative guilt or innocence of the
parties and the considerations relative to the children.

Nor

did the court give consideration to the ability of the parties
or earn money to support themselves nor was consideration given
to the financial condition and necessities of each party.

The

ultimate result of the decree as it stands will be to force the
defendant to sell the homestead of the parties and move his
family to a different location, disrupting their lives to the
extent that they will be removed from their friends, environment, and the schools and classes which they are accustomed to
and which are important to children of their ages.

The defen-

dant's option to purchase plaintiff's interest is a practical
impossibility based upon the income which he has demonstrated
he makes.

His only alternative is to be forced to sell the

property inasmuch as the plaintiff, as a co-owner, can insist
upon the cash equivalent of her interest.

Such a result does

not reflect consideration for the needs of the children, either
as to their need to stay in the present environment to which
they are accustomed, or their need to have adequate support
from their father, nor does the decision reflect the consideration that the plaintiff left her husband for pursuits of her
own, to satisfy her own interests and is largely at fault in
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this case.

Nor does the decision reflect the consideration

that the plaintiff is capable of supporting herself and has
adequate income in excess of her expenses to the extent that
she has accumulated over $6000.00 in savings in a period of
18 months and is fully capable of taking care of herself without fifty percent of the assets or value of the marital estate.
Nor does the decision reflect the consideration that the defendant's financial condition and necessities is much greater than
that of the plaintiff by reason of his obligation to support and
care for the children totally out of his own funds without contribution from the plaintiff.
The defendant testified that his income amounted to a
net $9 00.00 per month.

Of that income, the defendant would have

to pay to the plaintiff approximately $416.00 in satisfaction of
the $5000.00 annual requirement and would be left with less than
$500.00 for his living expenses, including expenses for caring
for the children and maintaining the household.

The defendant

is incapable of making the payment to his wife and satisfying
the monthly obligations which he presently has.

Thus, his alter-

native would be to sell the premises, liquidate his estate, and
attempt to find other accommodations more comfortable to his
family and his income.

It is defendant's contention that this

works a hardship on the family, upon himself, and represents an
injustice and abuse of discretion in light of the fuctual evidence produced at the trial which would indicate that the plaintiff is not entitled to one-half of the marital estate.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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As the

court found, the plaintiff is capable of sustaining herself
and is not entitled to alimony and her needs are certainly
not as great as that of the defendant and plaintiff's family.
Thus, the defendant seeks that this court determine a more
equitable and fair division of the property of the marriage
which would be least allow the defendant to remain in the
premises acquired during the marriage and relieve the defendant of his obligation to pay $5000.00 annually for ten years
to the plaintiff.

Defendant maintains that it is a more fair

and reasonable distribution of the marital assets to allow
him to keep the home and three and one-half acres of the real
property surrounding the home and would urge the court to
modify or instruct that the decree be modified to that extent.
Certainly, in light of the cases cited herein, defendant's contention that he ought to be entitled to the home
and three and one-half acres of the real property is not inconsistent.

On the basis of the facts of this case established

by the evidence adduced at trial, the one-third, two-thirds
formula for distribution of the marital estate should have
been followed by the trial court and its failure to do so was
abusive and not in the interest of justice and fairness to
the parties.

In fact, defendant maintains that the court

took a position contrary to the rule announced in the Anderson
and Cox cases in announcing that it had adopted the principle
of "equal distribution of the proceeds of acquisitions during
the marriage", (Tr.18) and that the court was very reluctant
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and resistant to accept any evidence adduced or attempted to be
adduced by the defendant or his witnesses to overcome the said
adopted principle.

Thus, defendant contends and maintains that

this court can appropriately sit in review and make the determination that the estate be divided according to the principles
announced in the Pinion, Anderson, and Cox cases.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
On the 10th day of December, 1975, the defendant caused
to be filed a motion for new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 59 states, interalia:

"(a) Grounds. Subject to the provision of Rule
61, a new trial may be granted to all or any of
the parties and on all or part of the issues, for
any of the following causes; provided, however,
that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if
one has been entered, take additional testimony,
amend findings of fact and conclusions of law, or
make new findings and conclusions, and direct the
entry of a new judgment: ..... (6) insufficiency
of the evidence to justify the verdict or other
decision, or that it is against law, (7) error
in law."
The defendant's motion for a new trial was supported by
a memorandum of points and authorities wherein he indicated that
it was his intention to have the court open the trial for the
taking of additional evidence regarding the issues pertinent to
distribution of the marital estate such as the relative fault of
the parties, the financial needs and conditions of the parties,

-14-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the ability of the parties to earn separate livings comfortably,
the considerations relative to the children, the money and property they possessed and how it was acquired, etc.
Defendant's motion for a new trial was premised upon
subparagraphs 6 and 7 of Rule 59 as quoted hereinabove.

De-

fendant has heretofore in this brief established the general
principle followed by this court in the recent case of Cox v.
Cox and the earlier case of Anderson v. Anderson.
in essence

That rule

is that a trial court, although granted a generous

amount of discretion in determining property distributions in
divorce actions, nevertheless is to be limited by the principle
that the estate ought to be divided along the lines of twothirds to the husband and one-third to the wife.

The recent

case of Leftwich v. Leftwich, _____ P2d _ _ _ _ _ _ (19 76) , although
not following the principle announced in the Cox and Anderson
cases, does not overrule said cases and the principle stands.
Defendant maintains that the one-third, two-thirds principle
is clearly applicable in his case based upon the facts and
the evidence of the case.

Thus, defendant contends that the

court's discretion was exercised in such manner as to be against
law and that the resulting decision was entered upon insufficient
evidence to support it.

Defendant clearly established the basis

for his motion for a new trial and has and did demonstrate that
the motion was meritorious and firmly couched in subparagraphs
6 and 7 of Rule 59.

Nonetheless, the trial court denied the
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motion for new trial and did not permit the defendant to produce
the additional evidence which defendant feels could have materially influenced the court's decision and have resulted in a
distribution which would have permitted him to keep the homestead
of the parties together with the three and one-half acre parcel
that he was awarded.

In effect, the defendant believed that he

would be capable of persuading the court through additional
evidence to relieve him of the obligation to buy his wife's
equity interest in the home.
CONCLUSION
This court has announced the general principle, in the
Anderson and Cox cases, that marital assets should be distributed one-third to the wife and two-thirds to the husband.

The

Supreme Court has also announced that the trial court should
consider elements relative to the amount and kind of property
owned by each of the parties, whether the property was accumulated jointly, the ability and opportunity of each of the parties
to earn money, the financial condition and necessities of each
party, the health of the parties, the standard of living of
the parties, the duration of the marriage, what was given up
by each party by the marriage, considerations relative to the
children, and the money and property that the parties possess
and how it was acquired.

Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67

P2d 265, and Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P2d 977.
Although the trial court is granted a broad discretion in
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determining the distribution of marital assets in divorce
actions, in the instant case, the discretion was abused for
the reason that the court had before it ample evidence which
would support its finding and concluding that the plaintiff
was not entitled to an equal distribution of the marital
estate of the parties but that the defendant should be awarded
a greater portion thereof.

Particularly, the defendant main-

tains that it is well within the principles announced by this
court in the cases aforesaid that he be relieved of his obligation to purchase his wife's equity interest in the home,
and that if he is not relieved of said obligation the decision
of the trial court constitutes an injustice to him in that he
will be required to sell said home and remove his family to a
more affordable accommodation*

Defendant maintains that the

evidence clearly demonstrates that the parties did not make
an equal contribution to the marriage and that the plaintiff
made a substantially smaller contribution toward the household, marriage, and acquisition of monies and assets.

Thus,

defendant urges the court to reverse the decision of the
trial judge with respect to the distribution of the marital
assets and remand the case with instructions that the distribution be made such as to allow the defendant to retain possession of the home of the parties and be relieved of his
obligation to purchase the plaintiff's equity interest.
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Further, the defendant maintains that his motion for
new trial was well founded on subparagraphs 6 and 7 of Rule 59
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and that the court's
denial of the motion for a new trial was error.

Defendant

alternatively urges the court to reverse the decision of the
trial court with respect to the distribution of the marital
assets and remand same to the trial court for the purpose of
hearing additional testimony with regard to issues relative
to making a determination of an appropriate distribution of
the marital assets.
Respectfully submitted,
GARY H. WEIGHT
ALDRICH & NELSON
43 East 200 North
Provo, Utah 84601
Tel: 373-4912
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
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